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Security management has become a major concern in today’s e-business systems due to ever-increasing attacks on 
enterprise servers. This has led to the increasing sophistication of network security tools and systems in e-business 
networks that involve a number of organizational entities cooperating over computer communication networks. Many 
large organizations are outsourcing the management of e-business networks. This paper examines the problem of 
security management in the context of an Management Service Provider (an organization that provides remote 
management of e-business networks). Existing security tools (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)) assist us in 
detecting attempts by unauthorized users to get access to networked information resources. However, the management 
of IDSs offers some interesting challenges (e.g., false alerts). This paper presents a policy-based management 
framework to solve this problem. 
 




E-business systems allow organizations to focus on 
their core strengths, while outsourcing many aspects of 
the business to business partners in a value chain. For 
example, many e-businesses now outsource the 
management of their IT networks to specialist 
organizations [7]. The increasing ferocity of cyber-
attacks is making organizations think seriously of more 
and more sophisticated security management solutions. 
Organizations now have firewalls, anti-virus, 
authentication, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
However, many of these facilities are either unused, or 
under-utilised due to problems, such as false alarms in 
IDS [1]. This paper presents a security management 
strategy for large e-business networks from the 
perspective of outsourced management. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The Section 2 starts 
with a background of current intrusion detection 
systems and the need for frequent management 
interventions. This is followed in Section 3 by our 
proposed architecture for Security Alert Management 
(based on management policies) that helps reduce 
frequent false alarms. Section 4 presents a case study 
of the implementation of this architecture in a large 
organization providing management services to e-
business networks in the Asia-pacific region. Finally,  




Many network security technologies require regular 
human intervention in order to receive the best 
protection. Consider firewalls and intrusion-detection 
systems (IDSs). Typically, these devices are setup so 
that they log information to a database. It is then up to 
the security engineer to analyse these logs and to 
identify network attacks or suspicious behaviour if, or 
while, they are occurring. Unfortunately, this can be 
very time consuming. 
 
Logs are generated and typically contain information 
for the following three events: 
A packet that is allowed to pass through a firewall. 
A packet that is blocked (denied access) at a firewall. 
A packet that satisfies one of the signatures in the IDS 
database. 
 
Thresholding rules are then applied to the above events 
to generate security alerts. Unfortunately, because they 
work on data from firewalls and IDSs, they also inherit 
the major problem with them, e.g., the generation of 
numerous false positives [2].  
 
This research reported in this paper aims to develop a 
framework whereby security alerts, in particular false 
or routine alerts, can be analysed and responded to 
automatically, saving precious employee time and the 
employer’s money. Routine alerts are those that we 
wish to appear but which we do not want to analyse. 
False and routine alerts are composed of many events. 
Our proposed framework is called Security Alert 
Management System (SAMS). This is a Policy-based 
management framework as discussed in [4], [5] and [6]. 
 
3. SECURITY ALERT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
(SAMS) 
 
SAMS uses the term policy to refer to a particular rule 
that defines a false or routine alert. Every policy is 
instantiated from a policy type. A policy type 
represents a set of policies that possess a similar 
underlying idea/pattern. For example, consider the 
following policy types: 
• If pattern A appears at least Z% of the time in the 
alert, then acknowledge this false/routine alert. 
• If pattern A appears at least Z% of the time in the 
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alert, AND if a pattern B appears at least Y% of 




Figure 1: SAMS framework 
 
The above policy types can be used to instantiate the 
following policies: 
• If the source IP address 127.0.0.1 appears 90% of 
the time in the alert, then acknowledge this 
false/routine alert. 
• If the source IP address 127.0.0.1 appears 40% of 
the time in the alert, AND the destination IP 
address 234.22.12.120, then acknowledge this 
false/routine alert. 
The policy types then really have no constraints, other 
than their realisation into code, which will be discussed 
later. 
 
3.1 SAMS Framework 
 
The framework presented in Figure 3 provides a design 
for the development of a system that analyses security 
alerts. It is called the Security Alert Management 
System (SAMS) framework. At a high level of detail, 
SAMS will wait for an event or trigger to start the alert 
analysis process. Once this event has been received, the 
alerts are retrieved from an alerts store. Each alert is 
then analysed with its corresponding policy, which is 
determined by the domain that the alert belongs to. 
Each policy will determine whether or not the alert is a 
false alert or a routine alert. The policy will also 
determine what action to carry out based on that 
analysis. 
 
The simple framework of SAMS reflects the nature of 
the problem, which is to analyse and respond to 
security alerts. However, its simplicity hides the 
powerful inner workings of the policies. The more 
verbose or complex your false or routine alerts, the 
more complicated your policies become. As shown in 
Figure 1, the framework is made up of three main 
components, the Policy Enforcement System (PES), 
the Policy Database and the Security Policy Manager 
(SPM). These will be described in the following three 
sections. 
 
3.2 Policy Enforcement System (PES) 
 
The PES does three things, as shown in Figure 2 with a 
triangle: 
A) Intercept an event/trigger. This event/trigger can be 
a mouse click or a timed event and invokes the PES 
process.  
B) When the PES is invoked, alerts are read from 
whatever format that they are stored as. 
C) Each alert, based on its domain is then compared to 
its corresponding policies found in the policy database. 
If a policy is found that matches the alert then the 




Figure 2: PES process 
 
The PES ‘waits’ for the event/trigger to start the 
process. Upon receiving this, it will ‘fetch alerts’ from 
the alerts store. Finally, it will ‘get the policies’ for this 
alert from the policy database. The policies that it 
retrieves are based on the alert domain. The policies 
are compared to the alerts and if one is found to 
“match”, then the appropriate ‘actions’ are carried out. 
The last step is actually a little more involved, which 
will now be discussed. Recall from the beginning of 
section 3 that we wish to define different policy types. 
Each policy type will define a false or routine alert. 
The PES will actually store the policy type definition, 
represented as ‘Policy Type A’ and ‘Policy Type B’ in 
the above diagram. The policy database will then store 
the particulars for the policy type definitions. For 
example, the PES may have the following as ‘Policy 
Type A’: 
If pattern A appears at least Z% of the time in the alert, 
then acknowledge this false/routine alert. 
 






1 Shellcode.* 90 
 
So if an alert that belongs to the alert_domain 1 is 
encountered, then the corresponding pattern 
(Shellcode.*) and percentage (90) will be replaced in 
the policy type. Encountering such an alert will apply 
this policy to it: 
If pattern Shellcode.* appears at least 90% of the time 
in the alert, then acknowledge this false/routine alert. 
If the alert satisfies this policy, then it will be 
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acknowledged. Note that the pattern supports regular 
expressions. By separating the policy type and its 
specific details, we allow a policy to be applied to 
various domains and alerts, without producing 
repetitive policies. As the policy types need to be 
coded, this also reduces code redundancy. 
 
In summary, the PES has been designed so that it 
stores the programming logic to analyse alerts. It in 
fact contains the skeleton of the logic. The remainder 
of the programming logic is obtained from the policy 
database. The reason for this separation is that many 
alerts have similar analysis.  For example, many alerts 
are analysed based on what event occurs the most often. 
So, instead of replicating the code for this analysis 
across all domains, we can save disk space and 
redundancy by storing only the skeleton of the code 
and storing the finer details in the database. Creating 
new policy types therefore involve coding them into 
the PES. 
 
PES is the only component that integrates with a 
current thresholding system. 
 
3.3 Policy Database 
 
This represents the database of policies. As described 
in the previous section, it will store the details of the 
policies in a policy table. Each domain is also 
represented in the Policy Database. This only makes 
sense since it is natural and easy to link domains with 
their particular policies via table joins. A schema such 
as the following can be employed for security alert 




Figure 3: Policy Database schema 
 
The table Domain will contain information about that 
particular domain. Policy_Details will contain 
information about all policies that have been created 
for the system and Domain_Policies is a lookup table 
matching the policies to the particular domains. So to 
retrieve the details for a particular policy the following 
query might be performed: 
select p.detail1, p.detail2 from domain_policies d, 
policy_details p where d.domain_ID=1 and 
d.policy_ID=p.policy_ID. 
 
The attributes returned from the above query can then 
be substituted into the policy type definition defined in 
the PES. The Policy_Types table helps with this task 
by associating a policy instance in the table 
Policy_Details to the policy type definition in the PES. 
 
3.4 Security Policy Manager 
 
The SPM is the GUI management tool that will allow 
you to manage the Policy Database. It will allow you to 
enable, disable or edit policies for your defined 
domains. The SPM will present the information from 
the database in an easy to read format allowing rapid 
creation of the policies.  
 
As discussed in the beginning of section , policies are 
instantiated from policy types. Hence, when we enable 
a policy, we are actually creating an instance of a 
policy type. Every instance is created by inserting the 
details for the policy into the policy database, 
discussed in the previous section. The policy created is 
then applied to a selected domain.  
 
When we disable a policy, we are actually removing an 
instance of the policy from the policy database. This 
involves removing various rows from the policy 
database to remove both the policy instance and its 
association with a particular domain. Note that when 
we disable a policy, we do not actually remove the 
policy type definition from the PES. We are only 
removing an instance of it, which is defined in the 
policy database. 
 
Editing a policy allows us to edit the details of a policy 
instance. For example, consider the following policy: 
If pattern Shellcode.* appears at least 90% of the time 
in the alert, then acknowledge this false/routine alert. 
The user could modify this policy by changing the 
pattern or changing the percentage value. Note also 
that editing a policy does not edit the policy type 
definition. Editing a policy only edits a policy instance. 
Editing a policy will perform a database ‘update’ query 
on the policy_details table. 
 
Note that whenever a new policy type is created in the 
PES, the SPM must also be updated so that it 
recognises it. The SPM must be updated so that one 
can enable, disable and edit policies based on the new 
policy type.  
 
4. CASE STUDY 
 
This section will use the SAMS framework to develop 
a working system. The system will be used on a 
thresholding system already in place at a company X. 
The company has asked its name to be withheld. The 
company is a leading IP networking and 
communications solutions provider in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
Of interest to this paper is the orginsation’s security 
division. The security engineers, among other tasks, 
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monitor the alerts from various firewalls and IDSs for 
various customers. The security division has 
implemented a thresholding system, which analyses 
events from firewalls and IDSs and based on 
predefined thresholding levels will generate alerts. 
These alerts are displayed to security engineers via an 
internal intranet web page. 
 
The SAMS framework helps design a system that 
automatically acknowledges false and routine alerts 
produced from the thresholding system. According to 
the engineer, on average it takes one minute to analyse 
one security alert. On an average day for the 
organisation’s security division, they receive 300 alerts. 
This means that every day, 300 minutes is used to 
analyse false alerts. If there are 230 working days per 
year, that equates to 1150 hours or 143 working days 
that are spent on analysing alerts. 
 
 
Figure 4: Current security architecture of  
company X 
 
4.1 Current Security Architecture 
 
Before we design a SAMS system, we must first 
analyse the current architecture to see where it fits in. 
The following diagram shows the current data flow of 
the organisation’s security division: 
The data sources log their events to a PostgreSQL 
database. The thresholding system rule base then 
generates the alerts. Security engineers will analyse 
these alerts and perform the required actions. As 
indicated Figure 4,  the security engineers are actually 
using policies when they are analysing the alerts. That 
is, the security engineers are applying certain rules for 




This Section presents the design of the proposed 
system based on SAMS (Figure 5). However, we first 
need to identify how our alerts are being stored.  
 
Figure 5: Proposed SAMS Architecture 
 
The PES will therefore perform a similar task. It will 
read in the alerts from a HTML file and In the case of 
the organization’s thresholding system, the alerts are 
stored as HTML files. Security engineers analyze alerts 
by entering an intranet web site. This web site provides 
the alerts and the events that make up in the alerts in a 
tabular format. It is then up to the security engineer to 
analyze these and acknowledge that they have been 
analysed. PES will only acknowledge the alerts if the 
policies in its database match the alerts. 
 
The next step is to identify the domains. In the case of 
thresholding system, these will be the customers. Since 
the organisation manages customer networks, it is only 
logical that we distribute policies according to this 
domain. The existing database already has this 
information in a table called ‘customers’. The schema 
for this table is as follows: 
customers(id, name, fullname, heat_id, 
gnc_name, speech_name) 
 
Hence for our SAMS system we will need to create these 
tables: 
policy_details(policy_id, description, …) 
cust_policies(cust_id, policy_id) 
policy_types(type_id, description) 
The full schema of policy_details will be worked out later. 
 
Our final step is to develop the SPM. Because the 
existing thresholding system is web-based, the SPM 
designed here will also be web-based. Similarly, 
because the existing thresholding system is developed 





After discussion with the organisation’s security staff, 
it was determined that the main policy type that should 
be created first, was one that specified a pattern that 
was most prevalent. That is, in the analysis of every 
alert, false and routine alerts tended to have a pattern 
whereby certain elements would be repeated. As an 
example of such an alert, refer to the following that has 
been used throughout this report: 
• If pattern Shellcode.* appears at least 90% of the 
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time in the alert, then acknowledge this 
false/routine alert. 
 
This is the first policy type that was coded into PES 
and which the SPM will recognise. Hence, after this 
decision was made, the schema for the table 
policy_details is as follows: 
policy_details(policy_id, devicetype_id, type_id, 
details) 
 
The important attributes are described here: 
• type_id: this is a foreign key to the policy_types 
table and associates a policy with its policy type. 
• details: this will be a string that contains the details 
for a policy. Since we are implementing the above 
policy type, this string will contain the pattern to 
look out for and the percentage that this pattern 
appears in the alert. More precisely, it will contain 
what specific details of an alert contain the pattern, 
what the pattern is and the percentage value. 
 
When the user is creating a policy, they must first 
select which components of an alert make up the “key”. 
The key is a combination of the attributes in the above 
table that the policy type definition will concentrate on 
when it is analysing it.  
 
The SPM was then designed so that it could properly 
manipulate the policy database. As mentioned, all 
development work for this system was done in Perl. 
The existing thresholding system was developed in 
Perl, so for compatibility issues, it was logical to select 




A successful SAMS system was developed on the 
development network. The following table shows how 
many alerts could have been automatically 




(for 26 November 
2003) 
Number of alerts that could 
have been automatically 
acknowledged 
00:00 to 01:00 6 
01:00 to 02:00 3 
02:00 to 03:00 3 
03:00 to 04:00 3 
 
This is but a four-hour sample of the number of alerts 
that could have been automatically acknowledged. It 
would equate to 15 minutes of saved alert analysis time. 








(for 27 November 
2003) 
Number of alerts that could 
have been automatically 
acknowledged 
13:00 to 14:00 7 
14:00 to 15:00 9 
15:00 to 16:00 5 
16:00 to 17:00 6 
 
The above would have saved 27 minutes of alert time. 
These alerts are all based on the same policy type 
specified in the previous section. Due to the nature of 
networks it is hard to predict how many alerts on 
average could be automatically acknowledged with this 
policy type. But it is clear from the above samples that 
significant time can in fact be saved. 
 
Future work will involve the creation of policy chains, 
introduction of policy priorities and the development of 
a policy type creator, since with the current framework, 
it is quite cumbersome to add other policy types. Also 
it is necessary to integrate the SAMS framework with 
the network and systems management framework [3]. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper, we have proposed a new framework, 
called SAMS, for the analysis of security alerts in e-
business networks. This framework incorporates 
foundational concepts in policy-based management  to 
solve the problem of false alerts that threatens to render 
many security tools (e.g., intrusion detection systems) 
useless.  
 
The framework that is proposed in this paper is free 
from many constraints on the policy definitions, unlike 
in the case of existing management policy frameworks. 
In fact, policies defined in this framework are 
constrained by the author’s ability to code them. This is 
hopefully a first step towards a framework that may 
become universally used in any system that generates 
alerts. 
 
The time and money wasted in analysing false and 
routine alerts is great as sproven by our case study 
figures. A system developed from SAMS can also be 
viewed as an “engineer-in-a-box”. Because the security 
engineer is telling the SAMS system what constitutes 
false/routine alerts, the system is really acting like a 
security engineer. As a consequence, if the security 
engineer decides to leave the organization for which 
he/she works, then the knowledge base of the engineer 
will be retained. 
 
Such policy-based management frameworks are likely 
to be used more increasingly for security management 
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